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According to the 2009 data, in reality among all child accidental deaths nationally, firearms were involved in 1.1 percent, compared to motor vehicles (41 percent), suffocation (21 percent), drowning (15 percent), fires (8 percent), pedal cycles (2 percent), poisoning (2 percent), falls (1.9 percent), environmental factors (1.5 percent), and medical mistakes (1 percent). Since the difference between accidental deaths due to medical mistakes (1 percent) and accidental deaths due to firearms (1.1 percent) is only 0.1 percentage points, perhaps we should consider a ban on pediatricians along with the ban they propose on firearms and large-capacity magazines.

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He wrote for S.W.A.T. in 2008 that among the things he tells his trainees early on is that “Today is the day you may need to kill someone in order to go home.”

“If you cannot turn on the ‘Mean Gene’ for yourself, who will?” he wrote. “If you find yourself in an ambush, in the kill zone, you need to turn on that mean gene.”

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In one revealing thread, forum members debated whether the use of force is justified if someone brandishes or fires a BB gun at another person.

Gelhaus chimed in, writing that “It’s going to come down to YOUR ability to articulate to law enforcement and very likely the Court that you were in fear of death or serious bodily injury.”

“I think we keep coming back to this, articulation — your ability to explain why — will be quite significant,” Gelhaus wrote.

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citizens must be permitted to use handguns for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.

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The court of appeals then reviewed each of the proffered articulable suspicions suggested by the officers. The court of appeals first noted that “Officer Zastrow’s suspicion that a lone driver at a gas pump who he did not observe drive into the gas station is engaged in drug trafficking borders on absurd. . . . [C]oncluding that Troupe’s presence in his vehicle at a gas station is suspicious is unreasonable.”

“Second, Gates’ prior arrest history cannot be a logical basis for a reasonable, particularized suspicion as to Black. Without more, Gates’ prior arrest history in itself is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion as to Gates, much less Black.”

“Third, it is undisputed that under the laws of North Carolina, which permit its residents to openly carry firearms . . . Troupe’s gun was legally possessed and displayed. The Government contends that because other laws prevent convicted felons from possessing guns, the officers could not know whether Troupe was lawfully in possession of the gun until they performed a records check. . . . We are not persuaded. Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status. More importantly, where a state permits individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, cannot justify an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states.”

Fourth, the officers’ assumption that where there is one gun there is most likely a second the court of appeals held that it “would abdicate [its] judicial role if [it] took law enforcement-created rules as sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. . . . Such a rule subjects to seizure or search anyone who actively or passively associates with a gun carrier. The seizure has no connection with the individual seized, the activity they are involved in, their mannerisms, or their suspiciousness; rather, the seizure is a mere happenstance of geography.”

“Fifth, it is counterintuitive that Black provided a justification for reasonable suspicion by volunteering his ID to the officer. . . . The record indicates that three of the six men provided identification to the officers, thus, Black’s action could hardly be characterized as overly cooperative. Additionally, we have noted that this type of argument—that cooperation is a justification for reasonable suspicion—actually places a defendant in a worse position than if he had simply refused to cooperate altogether because the Supreme Court has ‘consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.’ . . . Likewise, there is nothing suspicious about the fact that Black’s ID revealed he lived outside the district. . . . The pertinent facts remaining in the reasonable suspicion analysis are that the men were in a high crime area at night. These facts, even when coupled with the officers’ irrational assumptions based on innocent facts, fail to support the conclusion that Officer Zastrow had reasonable suspicion that Black was engaging in criminal activity.”

For these reasons, Mr. Black’s seizure was not reasonable. Accordingly, the decision to deny Mr. Black’s suppression motion was reversed. Rather than remand for further proceedings, the court of appeals vacated Mr. Black’s sentence.

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