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Even though they were first, California has never had a lot of nuclear power capacity relative to its population and consumption. There were a few very small reactors in the 50s / 60s which were mostly experimental, and aside from San Onofre, Rancho Seco was the only other large reactor installation. It was located up in the northern part of the state, and shut down in the late 80s under pressure from hippies. Only operated for about 15 years, which was a real shame.
The energy landscape in California is weird. Right now, the state imports about a third of its electricity. And in terms of in-state production, about 62% is fossil-based, mostly nat-gas. If Diablo shuts down, that figure will jump to over 70% fossil.
I am somewhat ( foolishly?) optimistic that the "thalidomide forever" crowd is being supplanted by some more pragmatic types. I was unfortunately complicit in the financial ruin of America's biggest sorta-private nuclear project. It seems that public opinion is finally starting to come around to the relative risks of nuclear waste vs fossil fuel byproducts.
As a bad analogy - would you rather live next door to a PE extruder who makes plastic bags, or a virgin-fiber paper mill? I've been to both, and it's an easy call.
I am somewhat ( foolishly?) optimistic that the "thalidomide forever" crowd is being supplanted by some more pragmatic types.
At least with thalidomide there was an actual, quantifiable danger. You could say "Look, if you take this drug while pregnant, then there's a such-and-such chance that your child will be born with one or more of this list of genuinely horrible, awful birth defects, assuming that they even make it out of the womb alive rather than dropping out of you as a clump of dead baby with no heart and no face."
Nuclear energy is different. I've never understood why so many people are opposed to it, aside from the seemingly patronizing explenation that "well, I don't understand anything at all about physics, chemistry, or base-load energy generation, but this pretty celebrity told me to be afraid of this thing despite the fact that, statistically speaking, it is the least harmful means of grid-scale energy generation presently available to us, both in terms of environmental cost and cost to human health, so I'm going to trust her."
Originally Posted by xturner
I was unfortunately complicit in the financial ruin of America's biggest sorta-private nuclear project.
I think we've talked about this before. You were at WPPSS, right?
Originally Posted by xturner
As a bad analogy - would you rather live next door to a PE extruder who makes plastic bags, or a virgin-fiber paper mill? I've been to both, and it's an easy call.
I've never lived next to a plastic extruder, but I have visited a paper mill. Virgin-fiber or not, I prefer to keep my distance from them, thank you very much. I don't even know how to describe that smell. It's like Satan's farts on taco night.
".... this pretty celebrity told me to be afraid of this thing despite the fact that, statistically speaking, it is the least harmful means of grid-scale energy generation presently available to us, both in terms of environmental cost and cost to human health, so I'm going to trust her."
Not to be too glib, but stupid people are stupid. I've been reading lately - even in the NYT - that environmentalist groups are coming around on the hazard/benefit ratio of nuclear power vs. fossil(or even hydroelectric).
I was with the AE on a couple of WPPSS units. About 90% of the blame for that fiasco was a combination of bad luck and mismanagement by the client, but we were happy to help out by maximizing our services and billings. That project was kind of "my MBA in How Not to do Stuff." The continuing problem is that the stupendous cost of the project combined with the client's default has made investing so many billions in a nuke seem very risky to lenders. If it hadn't been for Microsoft and Boeing bringing a renaissance, that part of the country's economy would probably still be hurting because of it.
Plastic plants smell vaguely like melting wire insulation, but not quite so acrid. Recycled paper mills smell bad, but not horrific. I went to a virgin-fiber mill in Cottonton, Alabama, and the smell from their water treatment facility was indescribably awful.
WASHINGTON — Proponents of nuclear power are pushing to revive a failed project to build two reactors in South Carolina, arguing that the demise of the $14 billion venture could signal doom for an industry that supplies one-fifth of the nation’s electricity.
Lindsey Graham
Even though the nation’s 99 commercial nuclear reactors supply about 20 percent of U.S. electricity, no new nuclear plant has been built from scratch in more than 30 years. Supporters were alarmed when two South Carolina utilities halted construction on a pair of reactors that once were projected to usher in a new generation of nuclear power to provide reliable, cost-effective, carbon-free electricity for decades.
Instead the project was plagued by billions of dollars in cost overruns, stagnant demand for electricity, competition from cheap natural gas and — most importantly — the bankruptcy of Westinghouse Electric, the lead contractor.
The July 31 suspension of the partly completed V.C. Summer project near Columbia leaves two nuclear reactors under construction in Georgia as the only ones being built in the U.S. The collapse of the nearly decade-old project in South Carolina could cost ratepayers billions of dollars for work that ultimately provides no electricity and could signal that new nuclear plants are impossible to complete in the United States.
“These reactors failing would be the end of a nuclear renaissance before it even started,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.
Graham and other lawmakers from both parties are urging Congress to extend a production tax credit that would provide billions of dollars to the South Carolina project and the two Georgia reactors. The House approved an extension in June, and Graham is pushing for a Senate vote after Congress returns from its August recess.
“I’m mad as hell that you spend all this money and you can’t get it done,” Graham said.
The Vogtle plant in Georgia faces similar economic and competitive threats, including the Westinghouse bankruptcy. The plant’s operator, Atlanta-based Southern Co., has said it will decide in coming weeks whether to finish the two reactors, which are years behind schedule and billions of dollars above projected costs.
Southern CEO Tom Fanning called Vogtle “the last (nuclear) project standing in America” and said it “goes beyond economics” to affect national security.
“If you want a world safe from nuclear proliferation,” construction of nuclear plants “is how we maintain nuclear technology,” said Rich Powell, executive director of ClearPath, a conservative-leaning clean energy group.
Besides the production tax credit, nuclear supporters want the extension of an Energy Department loan guarantee program that has helped Vogtle and other energy projects secure funding. Vogtle received an $8.3 billion loan guarantee under the Obama administration – the largest ever issued by the loan program and a deal that some critics say could end up biting taxpayers.
“We’ve said it for eight years: These massive nuclear reactor projects were doomed from the start, and taxpayer money should not be risked on them,” said Ryan Alexander, president of Taxpayers for Common Sense, a watchdog group.
The Summer plant did not receive a loan guarantee, but the parent company of South Carolina Electric & Gas, one of the utilities building it, tried to get a federal grant worth up to $3 billion before abandoning the project. SCANA CEO Kevin Marsh said he and other executives had “very direct discussions” with the White House and Energy Department, including Energy Secretary Rick Perry, and “explained the need for support for these projects because of the national security interest.”
A spokeswoman for Perry said the project’s failure has not dimmed Perry’s belief in nuclear power. “Secretary Perry remains optimistic about the future of nuclear energy in America and continues to watch this issue closely,” said spokeswoman Shaylyn Hynes.
The Energy Department invited the S.C. utility to apply for a loan guarantee, but “that invitation was ultimately turned down by the project’s representatives,” Hynes said.
Marsh, speaking at an Aug. 1 hearing before the South Carolina Public Service Commission, said a loan “doesn’t help the situation we’re in.”
The loan guarantees typically serve as long-term incentives for companies to take on major energy projects.
While President Donald Trump backs nuclear energy, the administration eliminated the loan guarantee program in its proposed budget for the next fiscal year. The program was a frequent target of GOP lawmakers during the Obama administration, especially a $535 million loan to the failed solar company Solyndra.
The White House supports extension of the production tax credit, saying it would “fulfill the president’s commitment to the continuation of nuclear energy as a major contributor to our nation’s energy production and security.”
The current credit requires plants to be operational by 2020 – a deadline neither the South Carolina nor Georgia project will come close to meeting.
Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-S.C., called suspension of the South Carolina project a shame. “I can tell you, wind and solar are not going to provide the kind of power that nuclear energy provides,” he said.
Southern Co. decides to press ahead with Vogtle expansion
Kristi E. Swartz and Hannah Northey, E&E News reporters Energywire: August 30, 2017 at 6:50 PM
ATLANTA — Southern Co. and other utilities building the Vogtle nuclear expansion project in Georgia are prepared to finish the reactors but will lay out a set of assurances that must be met in a filing with state utility regulators tomorrow, E&E News has learned.
This means Plant Vogtle will remain the only set of nuclear reactors under construction in the United States, at least for now.
Southern's Georgia Power Co., the main sponsor of the project, must secure regulatory approvals in Georgia. The utility and the public power co-owners also must have certain financial guarantees to complete the reactors, according to multiple sources familiar with the document.
Vogtle's future has been in flux since its main contractor, Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in March. Westinghouse's bankruptcy stemmed from significant cost increases at Vogtle and a separate nuclear project in South Carolina.
Westinghouse's parent, Toshiba Corp., has pledged $3.7 billion in payments to Vogtle regardless of whether the reactors are built. Toshiba must start making those payments in October to help underwrite the project.
Georgia Power's decision to continue building Vogtle is no surprise, but the electric company does not have the final say in whether Vogtle gets finished. That is up to the Georgia Public Service Commission.
The PSC filing will trigger a six-month review, which will give the company and commission time to see whether Toshiba makes its first payment, of $300 million, in October.
The other assurances the utilities are seeking are an extension of federal production tax credits beyond 2020 so Vogtle's reactors can receive them and additional money from the Department of Energy.
Vogtle and V.C. Summer in South Carolina were the first reactors to be built from scratch in nearly 30 years. The utilities stepped in to take over at their respective projects once Westinghouse declared bankruptcy, while figuring out on their own how long it would take to finish their reactors and how much that would cost.
Scana Corp.'s South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. and state-owned Santee Cooper stopped building V.C. Summer last month after deciding the additional costs to finish it would be too much for their customers to bear.
The political fallout from V.C. Summer's cancellation likely played into Georgia Power's decision to keep Vogtle moving forward.
Regulators recently reaffirmed their support for Vogtle by signing off on a list of things Georgia Power must include in tomorrow's filing.
That vote did not ensure that the commission will approve Georgia Power's request. It meant regulators were willing to take a hard look at whether the reactors should be finished.
Finishing Vogtle would give Southern, Georgia Power and the PSC the opportunity to say they pushed through a wide range of obstacles, the severity of which couldn't have been predicted when the utilities pitched the reactors years ago.
Georgia Power and the PSC also tout Vogtle as a way to diversify the utility's generation fleet and add carbon-free baseload electricity to the grid. Consumer and environmental advocates will likely argue that, whatever the increased costs, Vogtle's price tag will be too much for Georgia's customers to pay even if the costs are spread out over decades.
Here in Illinois, we are a net-exporter of electricity. So our coal-burning neighbors get to share in our fissiony goodness.
Just saw this after the thread was resurrected from the dead - good timing, considering Illinois just tossed Exelon $700M to keep Byron and Dresden running for another 5 years after they were set to be decommissioned. Without that, they'd be another mustard yellow splotch on the map.
I see the future being far more heavily laden in day-cyclic "renewables" (wind, solar, tide, circadian rhythm of human copper tops, etc.), and I'm interested in finding a way to profit from miniature-scale energy storage (say perhaps 300 kWh, or maybe even up to 1 MWh).
For the sake of argument, I'd like to briefly ignore the fact that state legislators who could effectively make it legally possible to profit from such an application are more or less bribed by the state-enabled distribution monopoly to make sure that the "little guy" can't currently participate in profits from the purchase, storage, and resale of electricity.
After much research, it occurs to me that an electrochemical storage option (battery) is likely the best option for miniature-scale storage. The economies of scale don't seem to favor other techniques such as heat storage, gravity-based systems (pumped hydro, lifted weight), pressure vessels, flywheels, or electrolyzed hydrogen storage, and batteries seem to have among the highest efficiencies so long as they're not batteries with wasteful chemistries (some batteries must maintain very high temperatures).
The "battery of choice" seems to be lithium-based batteries, but lithium batteries stand out to me as awful for any other purpose that isn't relatively compact or lightweight. Compactness and lightness are not beneficial qualities of an immobile storage solution. To be fair, I don't want a system that requires a 53-foot container per 1 kWh of energy storage, but I feel like there should be chemistries available such that I can get 100 kWh of storage out of a 53-foot container. Those chemistries ought to also be relatively stable, long-lived (10,000 cycles or more at 90% capacity), low maintenance, and "relatively" inexpensive (perhaps $10,000-$60,000 per 100 kWh capacity). For reference, Tesla squeezed 100 kWh of lithium cells into the chassis of the Model S P100D.
Does the thing I'm looking for actually exist, and I'm just too stupid to find it?
Now I'm going to stop ignoring the legislative issues around the idea. Why do I need to build a storage facility with a jigga-Whatt? hour of storage capacity in order to connect and profit off of the energy storage concept? It suspect that it's got a lot to do with paying enough money to get through the bureaucratic red tape of "profiting" from a grid-connected storage system - (Residential electricity systems have been able to constructively feed electricity into the grid for decades at this point.) Perhaps if I'm only running a 1 MWh facility, then I'll never be able to recoup the cost of sucking the collective d!cks of the correct distribution company's CEO and the correct set of politicians, but if I'm running a 1 jWh facility, then maybe I can recoup those costs over 10 or 15 years?
Should I stop focusing on finding and buying a battery system and instead redirect my efforts into supporting or building an information and connectivity platform that enables grid "crowd-sourcing" of storage capacity?
Also, I can't help but think that we'd be far better off right now with regard to energy prices and energy security if nuclear power production hadn't stagnated around Y2K. Maybe the fission pipe dream can save us all?
Also, I can't help but think that we'd be far better off right now with regard to energy prices and energy security if nuclear power production hadn't stagnated around Y2K. Maybe the fission pipe dream can save us all?
This is largely true. Fission isn't the answer for the foreseeable future, but any of the existing PWR designs or even several of the SMR designs would make a massive impact.
The biggest problem I'm seeing is that the government fed money via the infrastructure bill into a variety of next-gen nuclear startups, without addressing anything that would actually reduce costs. I chuckle when I see these $2B cradle to grave estimates for new plant design, licensing, and construction. It's not feasible within the current regulatory hurdles in the US. And unfortunately with many of these next-gen reactor companies, there's a bad case of "they don't know what they don't know." Not only is the licensing process alone incredibly expensive, tedious, and detailed, but the licensing and regulatory scrutiny is going to be even higher for the next-gen plants due to the elevated temperatures and pressures, which not only drive the use of materials not previously used for nuclear construction, but also inservice inspection and reliability programs that will be first of a kind. The only thing that makes nuclear hardware any more expensive than its non-nuclear counterparts is the paperwork behind it, and we're only going to require more of that, not less, moving forward.
This is largely true. Fission isn't the answer for the foreseeable future, but any of the existing PWR designs or even several of the SMR designs would make a massive impact.
Indeed. The licensing must be streamlined, and the lawsuits pre-empted by legislation.
The biggest problem I'm seeing is that the government fed money via the infrastructure bill into a variety of next-gen nuclear startups, without addressing anything that would actually reduce costs.(...) Not only is the licensing process alone incredibly expensive, tedious, and detailed, but the licensing and regulatory scrutiny is going to be even higher for the next-gen plants due to the elevated temperatures and pressures, which not only drive the use of materials not previously used for nuclear construction, but also inservice inspection and reliability programs that will be first of a kind. The only thing that makes nuclear hardware any more expensive than its non-nuclear counterparts is the paperwork behind it, and we're only going to require more of that, not less, moving forward.
Possibly.
Earlier in the thread, we discussed a couple of concepts which aim squarely to address these problems.
One is Design Certification. Historically, every reactor installation in the US has been treated as a custom job from a regulatory perspective. One of the advantages of factory-built small modular reactors is that once the design of the reactor has been established, tested, and proven safe, the NRC can issue a design certification to it, enabling the manufacturer to produce and sell many identical reactors without each one having to independently undergo review and approval.
This is effectively the same concept we have used for decades, for machines which are vastly more dangerous and numerous: cars and airplanes. Once the NHTSA and the EPA sign off on the design of a 2022 Toyota Plumbus, Toyota can build and sell as many of them as they want. They don't have to individually certify every specific car they build, so long as it conforms to the design which underwent certification originally.
Ditto aircraft. Bowang (a Chinese company, no relation to the Chicago-based airplane manufacturer with a big factory near Seattle) wants to release a new aircraft, let's call it the 7A7-400. They build a couple of prototypes, abuse the hell of out them, demonstrate that they're safe, promise that they haven't covered up any devastating fundamental design flaws with poorly-written software, and the FAA says "OK, bro. This airplane is good, and you may build and sell as many of them as you can dupe the airlines into buying."
The second is the Combined Construction & Operating license. This one applies to the end-user. In the past, building a new nuke plant was a risky proposition, because there was no guarantee that after spending many years and billions of dollars that you'd actually be granted an operating license, even if you did everything right. The new COL process gives that assurance. When the NRC grants permission to begin construction of a new plant, they are providing a guarantee that an operating license will follow provided that the construction is compliant with both the existing regulations and the design documentation.
Is this the end of bureaucracy? Definitely not.
But it seems like a step in the right direction.
Vogtle unit 3, meanwhile, it scheduled to start up later this year.
And it's looking more and more like Blue Castle is actually going to happen as well.
1) Think of a DCD as a "Rev. 0" for the designer. That DCD will undergo many revisions along the way, before it transitions to a UFSAR for the owner, which becomes the new licensing basis document (the UFSAR is basically a site-specific DCD). In order for the NRC to green light the DCD, it has to have considerably more detail than previous generation plants because they lose the ability to change their mind after the fact, like in the past (as you've noted). It is a guarantee that they will encounter many, many issues over the course of construction that require changes to be made. Be it commitments to publication years for codes/standards, material changes/substitutions, nonconforming conditions that can't be feasibly reworked, etc. Each one of those items requires a licensing/design change. Realistically, an "easy" one is a million bucks a pop, from inception through design and then back through licensing/regulatory reviews.
2) Also, as much as we'd like to think of a nuclear plant as a "widget" via the DCD (like a plane), the COL process complicates that. While your DCD may cover an existing design, the COL will drive other changes based on location - seismic analysis, safety issues based on proximity to other units, etc. So although the DCD offers a huge chunk of Ctrl+C, Ctrl+V into the UFSAR, there is still a ton of work to address everything required for the location being granted the license. And, since next generation reactor designs will, at a minimum, have to be licensed under Part 53, their licenses will be even more complex than the current generation of plants being built, which are already incredibly detailed. Imagine if GM built a car, but then NHTSA says before you can drive through Seattle, we need to see you analyze whether its safe to drive over each street in Seattle, ensure that if other cars around you crash that your car will not receive collateral damage that makes it unsafe, and go evaluate each store front to ensure that if you crash, you won't cause collateral damage to the surrounding buildings. Even if its doable, it's costly and time consuming, and regulatory/public review comment periods can come up with some off the wall **** you never thought of, but now have to address.
So, while DCD's and licensing under Part 52 are certainly a big help for the current generation of plants, they are still incredibly costly in the long run. Additionally, I also anticipate a much more rapid design evolution with next generation plants than current PWR/BWR designs as material evolutions allow the technology to be driven harder, so I don't expect a significant lifespan out of each certified design before having to undergo the DCD process for a "gen II" version. This is in part why I think the larger output (1000MW+) reactor designs may have a greater shelf life/viability than their smaller counterparts, without going into discussions regarding other up front costs and supply chain issues. Realistically, accepting a lesser amount of detail in the DCD's and COL's would go a long way towards allowing the Designer the flexibility needed to keep costs down. However, like all things, it's hard to "take it back" once that expectation has already been set, even though track record for public safety for nuclear plants gets a gold star in comparison to other fossil and renewables plants.
My hope is that when Vogtle is operational, other utilities will follow suit. Blue Castle is still in vaporware status as far as I know, though.
Last edited by Supe; 02-21-2022 at 02:28 PM.
Reason: I can't type.
Rarely has a publication in the US Federal Register delivered so much love in the very first paragraph.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to certify the NuScale standard design for a small modular reactor. Applicants or licensees intending to construct and operate a NuScale standard design may do so by referencing this design certification rule.
Wow.
NuScale is the first small modular reactor design reviewed by the NRC. NuScale is based on a small light water reactor developed at Oregon State University in the early 2000s. It consists of one or more NuScale power modules (hereafter referred to as power module(s)).
A power module is a natural circulation light water reactor composed of a reactor core, a pressurizer, and two helical coil steam generators located in a common reactor pressure vessel that is housed in a compact cylindrical steel containment. The NuScale reactor building is designed to hold up to 12 power modules.
Each power module has a rated thermal output of 160 megawatt thermal (MWt) and electrical output of 50 megawatt electric (MWe), yielding a total capacity of 600 MWe for 12 power modules.
All the NuScale power modules are partially submerged in a common safety-related pool, which is also the ultimate heat sink for up to 12 power modules. The pool portion of the reactor building is located below grade.
The design utilizes several first-of-a-kind approaches for accomplishing key safety functions, resulting in no need for Class 1E safety-related power (no emergency diesel generators), no need for pumps to inject water into the core for post-accident coolant injection, and reduced need for control room staffing while providing safe operation of the plant during normal and post-accident operation.
06-21-2016, 04:34 PM
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